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Abstract
This paper investigates whether and how the disclosure tone of earnings conference calls predicts future stock price crash 
risk. Using US public firms’ conference call transcripts from 2010 to 2015, we find that firms with less optimistic tone of 
year-end conference calls experience higher stock price crash risk in the following year. Additional analyses reveal that the 
predictive power of tone is more pronounced among firms with better information environment and lower managerial equity 
incentives, suggesting that extrinsic motivations for truthful disclosure partially explain the predictive power of conference 
call tone. Our results shed light on the long-term information role of conference call tone by exploring the setting of extreme 
future downside risk, when managers have conflicting incentives either to unethically manipulate disclosure tone to hide bad 
news or to engage in ethical and truthful communication.
Keywords Ethical financial reporting · Earnings conference calls · Stock price crash risk · Tone · Truthful communication · 
Voluntary disclosure
JEL Classification D80 · G10 · G12 · G14 · G30 · M41
Introduction
We investigate whether and how the disclosure tone of 
earnings conference calls is useful in predicting firms’ 
future stock price crash risk (i.e., extreme downside risk 
in returns). We are motivated by the ethical dilemma faced 
by managers in disclosure choices (Evans et al. 2001; Liu 
et al. 2015). On the one hand, managers may hide bad news 
and use optimistic language opportunistically for impres-
sion management purposes during conference calls (e.g., 
Clatworthy and Jones 2003; Liu et al. 2015; Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan 2007; Yuthas et al. 2002). Once the stockpile 
of bad news exceeds a certain threshold, stock price crashes 
occur, resulting in great losses to investors (Jin and Myers 
2006). On the other hand, due to reputation concerns, man-
agers may provide truthful information during conference 
calls instead of unethically manipulating call tone (e.g., 
Frecka 2008; Lee 2017; Yuthas et al. 2002). Moreover, the 
spontaneous and interactive nature of conference calls limits 
managers’ ability to unethically manipulate disclosure tone.
Previous literature highlights both the importance and the 
lack of credibility of qualitative information in voluntary 
disclosures. Quantitative information conveys only a partial 
picture of firm performance, while qualitative information 
completes the picture and provides incremental information 
for investors (Arslan-Ayaydin et al. 2016; Cho et al. 2009, 
2010). We focus on one of the most important channels of 
voluntary disclosures, earnings conference calls, which are a 
direct platform for managers to communicate with investors 
and contain rich qualitative information on firm performance 
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and outlook (e.g., Brown et al. 2004; Matsumoto et al. 2011; 
Price et al. 2012). Unlike written disclosures, conference 
calls contain managers’ own spoken words and spontane-
ous conversations between managers and call participants 
(i.e., analysts and investors), providing a useful setting for 
researchers and investors to observe managers’ disclosure 
behavior directly.
Disclosure tone captures both what and how information 
is disclosed (Loughran and McDonald 2016), reflecting 
both firms’ performance and managers’ disclosure incen-
tives. Some research on conference calls (Davis et al. 2015; 
Price et al. 2012) finds that the tone conveys useful infor-
mation to the stock market. However, the broad literature 
on accounting and business communication suggests that 
managers may use tone of corporate disclosures either to 
convey information truthfully or to inflate audiences’ percep-
tions opportunistically (e.g., Bozzolan et al. 2015; Cho et al. 
2010; Huang et al. 2014; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; 
Patelli and Pedrini 2014). This study examines whether 
managers engage in truthful communication or manipulate 
conference call tone opportunistically in the context of firms 
facing extreme downside risk.
Stock price crash risk captures a firm’s extreme down-
side risk and may cause major losses to investors and dam-
age stock market stability (Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 
2009). According to Jin and Myers’ (2006) agency theoretic 
framework, it relates to firm-specific events and arises from 
information asymmetry between managers and external 
stakeholders due to managers’ bad news hoarding behav-
ior. Previous literature reveals relations between various 
corporate disclosure attributes and stock price crash risk. 
For example, Hutton et al. (2009) find that opaque firms 
are more likely to experience stock price crashes, and Kim 
et al. (2019) find a negative relation between annual reports’ 
readability and stock price crash risk. Motivated by previous 
research, we investigate whether call tone conveys forward-
looking information that helps investors predict stock price 
crash risk.
We construct a large sample of US public firms’ confer-
ence call transcripts from 2010 to 2015. We apply firm-fixed 
effects models to control for unobservable time-invariant 
omitted variables and firm disclosure style, and lead-lag 
regressions to mitigate potential reverse causality issues. We 
find that less optimistic tone is associated with higher stock 
price crash risk, consistent with the notion that managers 
engage in truthful communication during conference calls. 
Our main results are robust to alternative model specifica-
tions, word classifications, tone measures and stock price 
crash risk measure.
We then conduct additional analyses to investigate the 
mechanisms for the negative predictive power of optimistic 
conference call tone for stock price crash risk. First, we find 
that the tone of both the presentation and question-and-
answer (hereafter, Q&A) sections predict stock price crash 
risk, and that the predictive power of the Q&A section tone 
is driven mainly by manager tone, not analyst tone, indicat-
ing that the predictive power is driven by managers’ own 
truthful disclosure intentions. Second, sub-sample analy-
ses suggest that the predictive power of call tone is more 
pronounced for firms with better information environment 
(proxied by analyst following) and firms with less equity-
based managerial incentives (proxied by CEO option incen-
tives). These findings indicate that managers respond to 
extrinsic motivations (i.e., external monitoring by analysts 
and equity incentives) by engaging in truthful communica-
tion in conference calls.
This paper makes significant contributions to the litera-
ture on ethical financial reporting, corporate voluntary dis-
closure and stock price crash risk. First, it contributes to the 
small yet important stream of research on ethical financial 
reporting behavior in oral financial disclosures. Most previ-
ous studies of ethical reporting focus on written disclosures, 
with limited direct observation of managers’ own behavior 
(e.g., Breuer et al. 2018; Cho et al. 2010; Craig and Amernic 
2018; Patelli and Pedrini 2015). Conference calls provide 
an appropriate setting for observing managers’ disclosure 
behavior and style directly. Our results show that manag-
ers’ ethical financial reporting in conference calls facilitates 
investors’ predictions of stock price crash risk in the next 
year, which is crucial to protect investors’ interests. Second, 
this paper contributes to the literature on voluntary disclo-
sure by examining how conference call tone predicts stock 
price crash risk over the long term. Specifically, rather than 
focusing on short-term market reactions to conference call 
tone, as in previous studies (e.g., Davis et al. 2015; Price 
et al. 2012), we provide new evidence on the forward-look-
ing information role of call tone in predicting extremely bad 
corporate outcomes in the long term (i.e., one year). Third, 
this study adds to the literature on stock price crash risk. 
Given the detrimental consequences of stock price crashes 
on investors’ benefits, investors must understand how to 
predict extremely bad events using soft information from 
qualitative disclosures. We also provide evidence supporting 
common assumptions in the previous literature that crash 
risk reflects firm-specific bad news and that managers may 
possess ex ante private information about such risk (Roll 
1988).
In the remainder of this paper, we review the literature 
and develop hypotheses, describe the data and empirical 
methods, and present our empirical results. We then discuss 
the study’s implications and limitations, and directions for 
future research, before drawing conclusions.
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Related Literature and Hypotheses 
Development
Literature on Earnings Conference Calls
Since the 1990s, earnings conference calls have emerged as 
an important channel for voluntary corporate disclosures 
(Bushee et al. 2003). These calls reduce information asym-
metry between firms and investors (Brown et al. 2004; Matsu-
moto et al. 2011), and provide useful information to financial 
market participants such as sell-side and buy-side financial 
analysts, individual investors and auditors (e.g., Hobson et al. 
2017; Jung et al. 2016; Matsumoto et al. 2011). Previous 
research highlights that attributes of these calls (including 
their tone) are informative for investors. For example, Matsu-
moto et al. (2011) find that call length reflects the information 
content of a call and that longer calls are more informative 
to the market. Lee (2016) focuses on spontaneity in manag-
ers’ conference call language, and documents that the market 
responds negatively to calls where the presentation and Q&A 
sections are similar because managers are using pre-scripted 
speeches to answer analysts’ questions.
Compared with written financial documents, which are 
carefully worded, conference calls are more interactive and 
spontaneous. They allow managers to disclose information 
flexibly, facilitating the revelation of managers’ discretion-
ary incentives and behavior (Bloomfield 2008; Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan 2007). Previous studies find that when man-
agers engage in financial misstatement intentionally, their 
conference call language may reveal the truth (Burgoon et al. 
2016; Hobson et al. 2012; Larcker and Zakolyukina 2012). 
Therefore, managers’ verbal and vocal cues in conference 
call disclosures are more suited than written disclosures to 
detecting their unethical reporting behavior.
Importantly, a burgeoning body of research investigates 
the tone of conference calls. Tone represents the sentiment 
of narrative disclosures (Henry and Leone 2016; Loughran 
and McDonald 2011). It indicates how optimistic the dis-
closure is, and reflects the firm’s past, current and future 
situations. Typically measured by the use of positive and 
negative words (e.g., Davis et  al. 2015; Loughran and 
McDonald 2011, 2016), tone captures both what information 
is disclosed (i.e., the disclosure content) and how (i.e., the 
optimism of disclosure). Tone significantly influences how 
investors perceive a firm’s performance and future prospects. 
For instance, Davis et al. (2015) report that, after controlling 
for firms’ past and future financial performance and charac-
teristics, cumulative abnormal returns correlate significantly 
with managers’ tone during conference calls, illustrating sig-
nificant short-term market reactions to call tone.
Despite the importance of conference call disclosures, 
there is limited evidence on managers’ reporting behavior 
in these calls from an explicitly ethical financial report-
ing perspective. Most relevantly, Burgoon et al. (2016), 
Hobson et al. (2012) and Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) 
report that managers’ linguistic characteristics and vocal 
cues in conference calls may reveal financial restatements, 
indicating the importance of conference call communi-
cation characteristics for detecting managers’ unethical 
reporting behavior. Unlike these previous studies, we 
explore the setting of extreme future downside risk cap-
tured by stock price crash risk, where managers have con-
flicting incentives either to unethically manipulate disclo-
sure tone to hide bad news, or to engage in ethical financial 
reporting and disclose truthfully.
Literature on Stock Price Crash Risk
According to Jin and Myers’ (2006) theoretical framework, 
stock price crash risk arises from information asymmetry 
between inside managers and outside investors. It therefore 
focuses on idiosyncratic returns affected by firm-specific 
information rather than market-wide risk factors (Roll 1988). 
Stock price crash risk is an important measure capturing 
the asymmetry of return distribution, and especially extreme 
negative returns in the left tail, for individual stocks. The 
2008 financial crisis highlighted the detrimental impact of 
stock price crash risk on investors. Since retail investors tend 
to construct their portfolios by investing in a small number 
of firms (Barber and Odean 2013), stock price crashes of 
individual firms within their portfolios have huge negative 
effects on their personal wealth due to under-diversification 
of their portfolios. Several streams of literature investigate 
potential determinants of stock price crash risk, including 
managers’ idiosyncratic characteristics (Andreou et al. 2017; 
Kim et al. 2016), corporate governance quality (Andreou 
et al. 2016), external monitoring mechanisms (Xu et al. 
2013) and informal institutional mechanisms (Chen et al. 
2019).
The prior literature also examines the role of corporate 
disclosures in predicting stock price crash risk. For exam-
ple, it has been found that opaque firms are more likely to 
experience stock price crashes (Hutton et al. 2009), and that 
aggressive tax strategies raise incentives for managers to 
hoard bad news and hence increase stock price crash risk 
(Kim et al. 2011b). DeFond et al. (2015) show that man-
datory IFRS adoption increases disclosure transparency, 
thereby decreasing non-financial firms’ stock price crash 
risk. In terms of corporate disclosure attributes, firms with 
higher-quality corporate social responsibility disclosures 
may experience lower stock price crash risk (Kim et al. 
2014), and less readable annual reports are associated with 
higher stock price crash risk (Kim et al. 2019), suggesting 
that managers hide bad news in complex financial reports.
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Our paper differs from previous studies by exploring spo-
ken disclosures in conference calls. These calls allow man-
agers to present information in a less-constrained manner, 
and contain ad hoc conversations between managers and call 
participants, making managers’ own disclosure behavior and 
style more observable to investors. Therefore, conference 
calls provide a suitable setting for investigating managers’ 
disclosure incentives and behavior.
Hypotheses Development
How conference call tone predicts stock price crash risk is 
unclear, because managers often face an ethical dilemma in 
making financial reporting decisions (Evans et al. 2001; Liu 
et al. 2015). This leads to two competing hypotheses. On 
the one hand, managers may be driven by self-interest and 
unethical intentions, and may engage in unethical financial 
reporting when the benefits of mis-presentation outweigh 
those of being honest or ethical, even if unethical behavior 
may be harmful to investors (Gibson et al. 2013; Hannan 
et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2015). Consequently, the credibility 
of voluntary disclosures is widely questioned. According to 
agency theory, managers are incentivized to overstate perfor-
mance by strategically concealing bad news and accelerating 
the release of good news (e.g., Huang et al. 2014; Kim and 
Zhang 2016). Optimistic language is important in evaluating 
unethical financial narratives, as it reflects firms’ attempts 
to distort perceptions (Yuthas et al. 2002).1 Ample evidence 
reveals that disclosure tone can be manipulated to hide bad 
news and inflate investors’ perceptions of the firm (Merkl-
Davies and Brennan 2007).
Optimistic language may serve as an impression manage-
ment strategy, emphasizing positive aspects of the business 
and obfuscating negative news (Cho et al. 2010; Clatwor-
thy and Jones 2003; Hooghiemstra 2000; Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan 2007). Therefore, we expect optimistic earnings 
conference call tone to positively predict stock price crash 
risk, leading to our first hypothesis (i.e., the impression man-
agement hypothesis) as below:
Hypothesis 1 The optimistic tone in earnings conference 
calls is positively associated with stock price crash risk.
On the other hand, managers have incentives to engage 
in ethical financial reporting and provide truthful informa-
tion during conference calls. First, there are various moti-
vations for truthful disclosures. Managers may have an 
ethical responsibility to speak in the interests of investors 
(Yuthas et al. 2002), and the financial market values ethical 
and transparent corporate disclosures (Jo and Kim 2008). 
The business ethics literature views the accuracy and trans-
parency of financial information as fundamental to ethical 
financial reporting (Frecka 2008; Holley 1998; Lee 2017; 
Ruppel and Harrington 2000; Whitener et al. 1998). Thus, 
managers may engage in ethical behavior to gain a reputa-
tion for behaving ethically and honestly (Jones 1995).
Moreover, the spontaneous and interactive nature of 
conference calls limits managers’ ability to manipulate dis-
closure tone unethically and opportunistically. Psychology 
research has long established that truth-tellers and deceivers 
exhibit different linguistic and behavioral tendencies due to 
cognitive processes and emotions (e.g., DePaulo et al. 2003; 
Newman et al. 2003; Pennebaker et al. 2003; Vrij et al. 2000; 
Zuckerman and Driver 1985). Several relevant accounting 
studies investigate whether managers’ language in confer-
ence calls may reveal the truth about firm performance. 
Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) find that linguistic features 
in conference calls help investors detect managers’ inten-
tional misstatements. Similarly, Hobson et al. (2012) show 
that managers’ vocal cues may also help predict financial 
misstatements. Collectively, these studies suggest that when 
managers intentionally engage in unethical financial report-
ing, their language in earnings conference calls gives them 
away and reveals the truth.
In the setting of extreme downside risk in stock returns, if 
managers engage in truthful communication and reveal rel-
evant information in conference calls, their tone is expected 
to reflect negative information relevant to stock price crash 
risk, with less optimism (i.e., more use of negative words) 
when stock price crash risk is higher. Negative words may 
be more truthful than positive words in corporate disclo-
sures. Previous literature shows that voluntary disclosures 
of bad news are generally more credible and truthful than 
disclosures of good news because managers have incentives 
to embellish positive aspects of firm performance (e.g., Hut-
ton et al. 2003; Rogers and Stocken 2005). With regard to 
disclosure tone, in gaging truthful communication, nega-
tive words have more discriminating power than positive 
words (Loughran and McDonald 2011). Negative words are 
less ambiguous than positive words because managers com-
monly negate positive words when releasing bad news, but 
rarely negate negative words in making positive statements 
(Loughran and McDonald 2016).
Therefore, if managers engage in truthful communi-
cation in conference calls, we expect less optimistic tone 
when stock price crash risk is higher. Accordingly, we pre-
dict that managers may engage in ethical financial reporting 
and truthful communication and exhibit less optimistic tone 
when stock price crash risk is higher. Our second hypothesis 
(i.e., the truthful communication hypothesis) is as follows:
1 Analytical research on voluntary disclosure argues that qualitative 
disclosures are “cheap talk” that may lack credibility, especially when 
difficult to verify (e.g., Baginski et  al. 2016; Kartik 2009; Stocken 
2000). Thus, managers may opportunistically inflate the tone of con-
ference calls through excessive use of positive words to hide bad 
news. We gratefully acknowledge a reviewer for suggesting this point.
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Hypothesis 2 The optimistic tone in earnings conference 
calls is negatively associated with stock price crash risk.
Data and Methodology
Sample
Our sample was constructed using earnings conference call 
transcripts of US public firms from Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
We focus on the post-crisis period from 2010 to 2015 to 
avoid potential confounding effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis. Daily and monthly stock data were downloaded from 
CRSP, accounting information was obtained from Compus-
tat, and data on analysts’ forecasts were drawn from I/B/E/S. 
The final sample contains 11,345 annual earnings confer-
ence call transcripts in English for firms with available finan-
cial data.2
Table 1 Panel A shows the sample distribution by SIC 
industry groups. Our sample covers a wide range of indus-
tries, with observations from “Manufacturing” contributing 
47.09% of the sample. Table 1 Panel B presents the sample’s 
relatively even distribution by year from 2010 to 2015.
Model Specification
To investigate whether the tone of earnings conference calls 
predicts stock price crash risk, we use the following regres-
sion model in our empirical analysis:
To address potential endogeneity issues, we employ 
firm-fixed effects to mitigate issues relating to unobservable 
(1)
CRASH_RISKi,t = 훼 + 훽 × TONEi,t−1 +
N∑
j=1
훾 j
× CONTROL
j
i,t−1
+ Firm Fixed Effect
+ Year Fixed Effect + 휇i,t
Table 1  Distribution of observations over industries and years
Panel A shows the distribution of observations of individual firm-years across 10 SIC industries. Panel B shows the distribution for the period 
2010–2015
Panel A: Distribution of observations over industries
SIC industry SIC codes Freq. Percent Cum.
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0–999 24 0.21 0.21
Mining 1000–1499 910 8.02 8.23
Construction 1500–1799 106 0.93 9.17
Manufacturing 2000–3999 5342 47.09 56.25
Transportation, communications, electric, gas & 
sanitary services
4000–4999 1355 11.94 68.2
Wholesale trade 5000–5199 351 3.09 71.29
Retail trade 5200–5999 727 6.41 77.7
Finance, insurance and real estate 6000–6799 309 2.72 80.42
Services 7000–8999 2186 19.27 99.69
Public administration 9100–9999 35 0.31 100
Total 11,345 100
Panel B: Distribution of observations over years
Year Freq. Percent Cum.
2010 1802 15.88 15.88
2011 2037 17.96 33.84
2012 1873 16.51 50.35
2013 1877 16.54 66.89
2014 1896 16.71 83.61
2015 1860 16.39 100
Total 11,345 100
2 This paper focuses on the predictive power of fourth-quarter con-
ference call tone, when firms make forecasts over longer horizons 
than in the other three quarters. Nevertheless, untabulated results 
show consistent evidence of the predictive power of call tone for 
stock price crash risk using quarterly tone data.
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time-invariant omitted variables.3 The application of firm-
fixed effects allows us to estimate the predictive power of 
tone for stock price crash risk while controlling for within-
firm variation. Year-fixed effects are also included to control 
for macroeconomic shocks. In addition, we apply lead-lag 
regressions to mitigate reverse causality issues. In Eq. (1), 
the coefficient of interest is 훽 , which captures how earnings 
conference call tone predicts stock price crash risk.
Measuring Stock Price Crash Risk
We measure stock price crash risk following Hutton et al. 
(2009), Kim et al. (2011a) and Callen and Fang (2017). 
Stock price crash risk focuses on idiosyncratic returns 
affected by firm-specific information rather than market fac-
tors (Roll 1988). First, we estimate the following regression 
model using weekly returns for each firm and fiscal year:
where ri,t is the return on stock i in week t, and rm,t is the 
return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in week t. 
To estimate this regression model, a firm must have at least 
26 weekly returns available in a fiscal year. Lead and lag 
returns for the market index are included to allow for non-
synchronous trading. Since the residuals from Eq. (2) are 
highly skewed (Hutton et al. 2009), the firm-specific weekly 
return (Wit) is defined as the log of one plus the residual term:
Three measures reflecting the asymmetry of firm-specific 
weekly returns are used as proxies for stock price crash 
risk. The first proxy, COUNT, is based on the number of 
firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.20 standard devia-
tions above and below the mean firm-specific weekly return 
over the fiscal year. COUNT equals downside minus upside 
frequencies. A higher value of COUNT indicates a higher 
frequency of crashes.
The second proxy is the negative skewness of firm-spe-
cific weekly returns (NCSKEW), calculated as follows:
where N is the number of firm-specific weekly returns of 
firm i in a fiscal year. According to Chen et al. (2001), scal-
ing the raw third moment by the standard deviation cubed 
allows comparison of stocks with different variances, and 
is a common standardization method in skewness statistics. 
(2)
ri,t = 훼i + 훽1irm,t−2 + 훽2irm,t−1 + 훽3irm,t + 훽4irm,t+1 + 훽5irm,t+2 + 휀i,t
(3)Wi,t = ln
(
1 + 휀i,t
)
(4)NCSKEW = −
N(N − 1)
3
2
∑
W3
i,t
(N − 1)(N − 2)
�∑
W2
i,t
� 3
2
A negative sign in front of the third moment denotes that a 
higher value of NCSKEW indicates a higher level of crash 
risk (i.e., a more left-skewed distribution).
The last proxy measures the down-to-up volatility of firm-
specific weekly returns (DUVOL). All weeks in a fiscal year are 
divided into two groups: down weeks with firm-specific weekly 
returns below the annual mean, and up weeks with firm-specific 
weekly returns above the annual mean. DUVOL is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of firm-specific 
weekly returns in down weeks to that in up weeks:
where WiD,t∕WiU ,t is firm i’s firm-specific weekly return in a 
down/up week, and ND∕NU is the number of down/up weeks 
in a fiscal year. A higher value of DUVOL (i.e., a more left-
skewed distribution) indicates that a stock is more “crash 
prone”.
Measuring Conference Call Disclosure Tone
Our independent variable of interest is the tone of conference 
calls, measured using the frequency of positive and negative 
words in sample call transcripts.4 We rely on positive and 
negative wordlists from Loughran and McDonald’s diction-
ary,5 which was specifically developed for financial disclo-
sures and is one of the most widely used and comprehensive 
dictionaries for tone measurement in financial documents.
We calculate the tone of the whole call (TONE_C), the pres-
entation section (TONE_P) and the Q&A section (TONE_Q) 
as the difference between the numbers of positive and negative 
words scaled by the total number of words in the call or a spe-
cific section. We also calculate managers’ (participants’) tone, 
TONE_MAN (TONE_PAR) as the difference between positive 
and negative words scaled by the total words spoken by man-
agers (participants) during the Q&A section. Higher values of 
tone variables indicate higher levels of optimism.6
(5)DUVOL = ln
��
NU − 1
�∑
W2
iD,t�
ND − 1
�∑
W2
iU ,t
�
4 In this paper, tone is defined as disclosure tone and is measured by 
the use of positive or negative words. This definition differs from the 
linguistic concept of ‘evaluation marker’ and the psychology concept 
of ‘affective states’. We thank a reviewer for raising this point.
5 We use the March 2015 version of the dictionary, available at http://
www3.nd.edu/~mcdon ald/Word_Lists .html.
6 Higher values of tone variables also indicate low levels of pessi-
mism. Loughran and McDonald (2016) show that measuring tone 
using positive words may introduce measurement error and lead 
to low statistical power in empirical tests. To mitigate this concern, 
we perform robustness tests using the net pessimistic tone measure 
(calculated as the percentage of negative words in the total number 
of words). The results in Online Appendix Table A1 suggest that our 
findings are robust.
3 Results are not sensitive to the use of industry-fixed effects instead 
of firm-fixed effects.
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Control Variables
The control variables in our regression models follow pre-
vious research on stock price crash risk (Andreou et al. 
2016; Chen et al. 2001; DeFond et al. 2015; Hutton et al. 
2009; Kim and Zhang 2016; Kim et al. 2016). To control 
for investor belief heterogeneity, we include the detrended 
stock trading volume (∆TURNOVER) to measure differences 
of opinion among investors. To capture the potential per-
sistence of the third moment of stock returns and address 
concerns about dynamic endogeneity, we use the lag value 
of the negative skewness of past firm-specific stock returns 
(NCSKEW) as a control variable. Stocks with higher past 
returns and higher volatilities have greater potential to expe-
rience crashes; therefore, the average and standard deviation 
of firm-specific weekly return (MEANFSRET and STDFS-
RET) over the previous year are included in the regression. 
In addition, conference call discussions and tone may reflect 
firm fundamentals and historical performance. To control for 
firm performance and the discussion content of calls, vari-
ous quantitative performance and fundamental character-
istics are considered: firm size (SIZE), which is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s market capitalization; market-to-book 
ratio (MTB); financial leverage (LEV), which is the ratio of 
long-term debt to total assets; and return on assets (ROA). 
Finally, given analysts’ important role in firms’ information 
environment, we include the natural logarithm of the number 
of analysts following the firm (# ANALYSTS).
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
In testing whether conference call tone may predict stock 
price crash risk, the key underlying assumptions are that 
this risk reflects firm-specific information, and that man-
agers possess private information about it. To justify these 
assumptions, we randomly selected 50 crash events, identi-
fied relevant news in the crash weeks through Nexis, and 
analyzed the nature of this news. The results are presented 
in Table 2 Panel A. We find that 28 of these crash events 
were accompanied by firm-specific news in that week. This 
news was largely performance- or operations-related, such 
as corporate expansion, change of distributor or manager, or 
acquisition announcements. The nature of these news events 
suggests that, in many cases, managers had private ex ante 
information that was informative in predicting crash risk, 
which may have been reflected in the conference call tone.
Table 2 Panel B presents summary statistics for main var-
iables. The mean values of COUNT, NCSKEW and DUVOL 
are 0.014, 0.076 and 0.042, respectively. The average overall 
conference call tone (TONE_C) is 0.671 and the mean value 
of TONE_P is 0.985, while the mean of TONE_Q is 0.417, 
suggesting that the tone of the presentation section is on 
average more optimistic than that of the Q&A section. In 
the Q&A section, the mean value of TONE_MAN is 0.672, 
while that of TONE_PAR is − 0.184, consistent with Brock-
man et al.’s (2015) evidence that manager tone conveys more 
optimism than participant tone.
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. Panel A shows 
that all three measures of stock price crash risk are signifi-
cantly and negatively correlated with earnings conference 
call tone, and that these measures are highly positively cor-
related, indicating that they capture common aspects of stock 
price crash risk. Panel B displays correlations between pairs 
of tone measures. As expected, all tone measures are posi-
tively correlated, but with distinct linguistic styles for dif-
ferent sections and speakers.
Main Results
Table 4 presents the firm-fixed effect regression results for 
stock price crash risk on lagged overall conference call tone.7 
In columns (1) to (3), COUNT, NCSKEW and DUVOL are 
the dependent variables, respectively. The results show that, 
for all three stock price crash risk measures, the coefficient 
on TONE_C is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. With respect to economic significance, in model (1), 
one standard deviation (0.461) increase in TONE_C leads to 
a 0.461 × 0.092 = 0.042 decrease in COUNT. In model (2), 
the coefficient on TONE_C is − 0.174, with a t statistic of 
− 4.95, indicating that increasing TONE_C by one standard 
deviation decreases NCSKEW by 0.461 × 0.174 = 0.080 . In 
model (3), the coefficient on TONE_C is − 0.103, with a t 
statistic of − 4.69, which indicates that one standard devia-
tion increase in TONE_C leads to a decrease in DUVOL by 
0.461 × 0.103 = 0.047 . Additionally, recent research reveals 
that the appropriateness of panel OLS and the usefulness of 
hypothesis testing based on t-statistics are affected by sample 
size (Kim et al. 2018). Using Kim et al.’s (2018) method, 
for the 5% significance level and a two-tail test for a sample 
with 8004 observations, the adjusted critical value for the 
t-statistic is − 3.55. Thus, the coefficient on TONE_C in each 
of columns (1) to (3) in Table 4 is negative and remains sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level.8 Taken together, confer-
ence call tone optimism negatively predicts stock price crash 
7 The number of observations shown in Table  4 is 8004, which is 
smaller than the sample size discussed in the “Sample” sub-section 
because we use lead-lag regression, as specified in Eq. (1).
8 Our subsequent analyses are also robust when using the adjusted 
critical value for t-statistics calculated using Kim et  al.’s (2018) 
method.
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risk, consistent with the truthful communication hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2).9 Furthermore, the information role of call 
tone in predicting stock price crash risk is both statistically 
and economically significant.10
Robustness Checks
Addressing Word Misclassification
It is crucial to control for the effect of word misclassification 
(Loughran and McDonald 2016). Appendix B presents the 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
This table shows summary statistics for relevant news in crash weeks (Panel A) and key variables for US firms with earnings conference calls 
during the period 2010–2015 (Panel B). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
Panel A: Relevant news in crash week
Category Frequency Percent
No news 22 44
Operations-related event 11 22
Earnings release 6 12
Under-performance 5 10
Merger and acquisition 3 6
Executive turnover 1 2
Other 1 2
SEC investigation 1 2
Total 50 100
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for key variables
Variable Number Mean Std P25 Median P75
CRASH 11,345 0.216 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000
COUNT 11,345 0.014 0.620 0.000 0.000 0.000
NCSKEW 11,345 0.076 0.840 − 0.409 0.016 0.479
DUVOL 11,345 0.042 0.520 − 0.308 0.016 0.360
∆TURNOVER 11,345 − 0.005 0.107 − 0.038 − 0.005 0.026
STDFSRET 11,345 0.045 0.023 0.028 0.040 0.056
MEANFSRET 11,345 − 0.124 0.136 − 0.154 − 0.078 − 0.039
SIZE 11,345 7.041 1.858 5.786 7.015 8.266
MTB 11,345 2.913 3.390 1.114 1.896 3.287
LEV 11,345 0.189 0.180 0.003 0.160 0.308
ROA 11,345 0.010 0.148 − 0.003 0.039 0.077
#ANALYSTS 11,345 2.036 1.051 1.386 2.197 2.833
TONE_C 11,345 0.671 0.461 0.361 0.658 0.976
TONE_P 11,345 0.985 0.682 0.527 0.975 1.436
TONE_Q 11,345 0.417 0.457 0.121 0.408 0.704
TONE_MAN 11,345 0.672 0.514 0.331 0.647 0.992
TONE_PAR 11,345 − 0.184 0.661 − 0.560 − 0.156 0.245
RE_TONE_C 10,008 0.002 0.447 − 0.305 − 0.006 0.296
9 Our results are robust after controlling for additional variables, 
including short-term market reactions, other conference call charac-
teristics, annual report characteristics and complexity, executive char-
acteristics and incentives, and corporate governance features. Rel-
evant results are presented in the Online Appendix. While firm-fixed 
effect regression controls for time-invariant omitted factors, it fails 
to control for selection bias caused by time-varying factors. To this 
end, we adopt a propensity score-matching approach. The treatment 
group (control group) includes firms with conference call tone above 
(below) the median. These groups are matched to be as statistically 
alike as possible, with covariates the same as controls in the main 
regressions. The matched firms use a nearest neighbor algorithm with 
caliper 0.01, no replacement and results restricted to common sup-
port. After matching, we still find a significant and negative associa-
tion between conference call tone and stock price crash risk.
10 The economic significance of the coefficient on TONE_C is com-
parable with previous literature (e.g., Blau et al. 2015). Additionally, 
as we focus on the long-term predictive power of tone, the economic 
significance of predictive power is smaller than that over a shorter 
horizon. As conference calls are a timely disclosure platform, call 
tone is expected to have stronger economic significance over a shorter 
horizon.
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30 most frequently used negative and positive words in our 
sample. “Question” and “questions” account for more than 
25% of all negative words in our sample, but are commonly 
used neutrally by analysts. For example, analysts usually 
start their questions with “I have a question on…”. To ensure 
that our results are not driven by word misclassification, 
we measure tone in two alternative ways: (1) using a term-
weighting scheme to reduce the impact of these two words; 
and (2) excluding “question” and “questions” from the neg-
ative wordlist. Untabulated results confirm that our main 
results are robust to using these two alternative measures.
Stock Price Crash Risk and Residual Tone
The primary tone measurement in main analyses is measured 
using conference call dialogue relating to both past perfor-
mance and forward-looking statements. Thus, the tone meas-
urement may be driven by firms’ historical performance and 
fundamental attributes. To mitigate such concerns, we use 
a residual tone measurement to proxy for the unexpected 
optimistic or pessimistic component of tone that cannot be 
explained by firms’ fundamental characteristics or past finan-
cial performance (Borochin et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2014).
The residual tone is calculated from a cross-sectional 
regression of tone on firms’ current year performance and 
fundamentals. Following previous research (Borochin et al. 
2018; Huang et al. 2014), our residual tone measurement 
(RE_TONE_C) is calculated as the residual term ( 휖 ) of the 
following regression:11
(6)
TONEjt = 훼 + 훽1EARNjt + 훽2RETjt + 훽3SIZEjt + 훽4BTMjt
+ 훽5STD_RETjt + +훽6STD_EARNjt + 훽7AGEjt
+ 훽8BUSSEGjt + 훽9GEOSEGjt + +훽10LOSSjt
+ 훽11ΔEARNjt + 훽12AFEjt + 훽13AFjt + 휖jt
Table 3  Correlations
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients between pairs of key variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Values in bold represent correlations significant at the 1% level
Panel A: Dependent and control variables
COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL TONE_C ∆TURNOVER STDFSRET MEANFSRET SIZE MTB LEV ROA
COUNT 1
NCSKEW 0.79 1
DUVOL 0.65 0.90 1
TONE_C − 0.06 − 0.09 − 0.10 1
∆TURNOVER 0.01 0.05 0.05 − 0.03 1
STDFSRET − 0.02 0.05 0.05 − 0.13 0.22 1
MEANFSRET 0.04 − 0.02 − 0.03 0.12 − 0.25 − 0.96 1
SIZE 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.13 − 0.03 − 0.58 0.50 1
MTB − 0.05 − 0.05 − 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.03 − 0.04 0.17 1
LEV 0.01 0.01 0.01 − 0.06 0.03 − 0.13 0.10 0.21 0.01 1
ROA 0.01 − 0.03 − 0.02 0.13 − 0.03 − 0.49 0.50 0.37 − 0.05 0.01 1
#ANALYSTS 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 − 0.03 − 0.24 0.22 0.50 0.09 0.15 0.16
Panel B: Tone measures
TONE_C TONE_P TONE_Q TONE_MAN
TONE_C 1
TONE_P 0.84 1
TONE_Q 0.75 0.38 1
TONE_MAN 0.70 0.38 0.89 1
TONE_PAR 0.40 0.18 0.60 0.23
11 In order to obtain the residual tone measure, we regress confer-
ence call tone (TONE) on the ratio of EBIT to beginning total assets 
(EARN), contemporaneous annual stock returns (RET), the natural 
logarithm of the market capitalization at the end of one fiscal year 
(SIZE), book-to-market ratio at the end of one fiscal year (BTM), 
the standard deviation of monthly stock return over one fiscal year 
(STD_RET), the standard deviation of EARN over the previous five 
years (STD_EARN), the natural logarithm of one plus age from the 
first year the firm entered the CRSP dataset (AGE), the natural loga-
rithm of one plus the number of business segments (BUSSEG), the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of geographic segments 
(GEOSEG), a dummy variable which equals 1 when EARN is nega-
tive (LOSS), the first difference of EARN (∆EARN), analyst forecast 
error (AFE), and analyst consensus forecast for one-year-ahead earn-
ings per share divided by stock price per share at the end of the fiscal 
year (AF).
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We replace our primary tone variable with residual tone, 
and re-estimate our baseline regressions.12 The results in 
Table 5 Panel A show that our main findings are robust to 
using residual tone. This confirms that more optimistic resid-
ual tone predicts lower stock price crash risk and mitigates 
concerns that the predictive power of tone may be driven 
by firms’ fundamentals and quantitative information within 
disclosures.
Stock Price Crash Risk and Tone Change
We also test whether our finding for the information role of 
tone in predicting stock price crash risk is robust when con-
sidering tone change. Previous research shows that changes 
in disclosure tone alter investors’ perceptions of firms. For 
example, Feldman et al. (2010) report that tone changes 
in firms’ SEC filings significantly affect market returns 
around the filing date window. In the context of predicting 
stock price crash risk, we expect that when managers’ tone 
becomes more optimistic, firms face lower stock price crash 
risk.
To test this, we conduct a change analysis. Following pre-
vious literature (e.g., Davis et al. 2012; Feldman et al. 2010; 
Henry and Leone 2016), we define tone change as the tone 
of managers’ conference call disclosures in the current year 
compared with the previous year. The results (Table 5 Panel 
B) show that if tone becomes more optimistic in the current 
year than in the previous year, the firm will experience lower 
stock price crash risk.
Alternative Measure of Stock Price Crash Risk
In addition to COUNT, NCSKEW and DUVOL, previous lit-
erature (e.g., Kim et al. 2016; Andreou et al. 2016) also uses 
an alternative measure for stock price crash risk, CRASH. 
CRASH is defined as an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
a firm experiences one or more weeks with firm-specific 
weekly returns exceeding 3.20 standard deviations below the 
mean firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, and 
0 otherwise. The results for regressing CRASH on TONE_C 
and RE_TONE_C using logit regressions are reported in 
Table 5 Panel C. Model (1) shows that the coefficient on 
TONE_C is negative and statistically significant (− 0.357, 
with a t statistic of 3.37), suggesting that firms with more 
optimistic conference call tone are less likely to experience 
a stock price crash, consistent with our main results. Similar 
inferences are drawn from using RE_TONE_C, as shown in 
Model (2).
Additional Analyses
This section investigates explanations for the underlying 
mechanism of the predictive power of call tone for stock 
price crash risk.
Different Call Sections and Participants
In this sub-section, we explore whether the negative predic-
tive power of optimistic conference call tone is attributable 
to managers’ own truthful communication intentions or fail-
ure to withhold bad news. First, we analyze the predictive 
power of the tone of the presentation and Q&A sections, 
Table 4  Tone of conference call and stock price crash risk
This table presents regression results for the predictive power of con-
ference call tone on SPCR. The dependent variables in Models (1), 
(2) and (3) are COUNT, NCSKEW and DUVOL, respectively. The key 
independent variable is conference call tone, TONE_C. All continu-
ous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statis-
tics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
firm. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% lev-
els, respectively
(1) (2) (3)
COUNTt NCSKEWt DUVOLt
TONE_Ct−1 − 0.092*** − 0.174*** − 0.103***
(− 3.59) (− 4.95) (− 4.69)
∆TURNOVERt−1 0.061 0.029 − 0.050
(0.70) (0.24) (− 0.65)
NCSKEWt−1 − 0.139*** − 0.221*** − 0.119***
(− 13.21) (− 15.67) (− 14.28)
STDFSRETt−1 − 0.494 − 1.219 2.339
(− 0.20) (− 0.36) (1.14)
MEANFSRETt−1 0.065 0.080 0.509
(0.16) (0.14) (1.60)
SIZEt−1 0.250*** 0.456*** 0.310***
(9.01) (11.64) (12.64)
MTBt−1 − 0.003 0.002 0.002
(− 0.44) (0.25) (0.40)
LEVt−1 0.227 0.456** 0.270**
(1.55) (2.35) (2.34)
ROAt−1 0.061 − 0.069 − 0.042
(0.46) (− 0.39) (− 0.37)
#ANALYSTSt−1 0.034 0.088* 0.047
(0.94) (1.79) (1.55)
Constant − 2.021*** − 3.037*** − 2.037***
(− 8.23) (− 8.59) (− 8.72)
Observations 8004 8004 8004
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.10 0.10
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
12 The original number of observations for RE_TONE_C is 10,008, 
and the final number of observations is 7231 in Table  5 owing to 
lead-lag regression specification.
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respectively. When managers have incentives to hoard bad 
news but fail to do so, we expect the negative predictive 
power of optimistic call tone to be driven by the Q&A sec-
tion tone. This is because the presentation section can be 
carefully scripted in advance to strategically hide bad news, 
whereas in the Q&A section, managers may be pressured by 
questions from call participants into disclosing information 
required by participants, making them more likely to divulge 
their true opinions on firm performance and outlook (Mat-
sumoto et al. 2011). The results (Table 6 Panel A) show that 
optimistic tone in both the presentation and Q&A sections 
has significant and negative predictive power for stock price 
crash risk. The more optimistic the tone of either section, 
the lower the stock price crash risk. Furthermore, the coef-
ficients on the Q&A section tone are larger than those on 
the presentation section tone. This indicates that while the 
former is more important for predicting stock price crash 
risk, managers also engage in truthful disclosure in the pres-
entation section.
Next, we investigate whether the negative predictive 
power of the optimistic Q&A section tone is driven by 
managers or other call participants (mainly analysts). Pre-
vious research shows that both manager tone and partici-
pant tone convey useful information (Borochin et al. 2018; 
Brockman et al. 2015). However, it is difficult to predict ex 
ante whether both manager tone and participant tone have 
Table 5  Results of robustness tests
This table presents regression results of robustness tests using alternative tone and stock price crash risk measures. Panels A and B present 
results obtained using two alternative measures of tone, residual tone (RE_TONE_C) and change in tone (∆TONE_C), respectively. The depend-
ent variables in Models (1), (2) and (3) are COUNT, NCSKEW and DUVOL, respectively. Panel C presents results obtained using an alternative 
stock price crash risk measure, CRASH. The key independent variables in Models (1) and (2) of Panel C are conference call tone (TONE_C) and 
residual tone of earnings conference call (RE_TONE_C), respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, ** and *** Represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3)
COUNTt NCSKEWt DUVOLt
Panel A: Residual tone of conference call and stock price crash risk
RE_TONE_Ct−1 − 0.083*** − 0.156*** − 0.094***
(− 3.00) (− 4.16) (− 4.07)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7231 7231 7231
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.11 0.10
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Change in tone of conference call and stock price crash risk
ΔTONE_Ct−1 − 0.043* − 0.119*** − 0.076***
(− 1.89) (− 3.79) (− 3.97)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5504 5504 5504
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.02
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2)
CRASHt CRASHt
Panel C: Tone of conference call and stock price crash indicator
TONE_Ct−1 − 0.357***
(− 3.37)
RE_TONE_Ct−1 − 0.307***
(− 2.70)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 4703 4311
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes
 X. Fu et al.
1 3
significant predictive power for stock price crash risk. On the 
one hand, manager tone may reflect useful forward-looking 
information. As managers possess private information, they 
know more about future crashes than call participants, and 
may communicate such negative outlooks truthfully using 
less optimistic tone. In this case, we would expect optimis-
tic manager tone to have significant and negative predictive 
power and to drive the predictive power of the Q&A tone. 
On the other hand, participant tone may have greater predic-
tive power, as previous research shows that analysts’ partici-
pation and tone lead to stronger market reactions (Borochin 
et al. 2018; Brockman et al. 2015; Matsumoto et al. 2011). 
Thus, optimistic participant tone may also have negative 
predictive power for stock price crash risk and may drive 
the predictive power of the Q&A tone. The results (Table 6 
Panel B) show that the coefficients on both TONE_MAN and 
TONE_PAR are significant, suggesting that both optimistic 
manager tone and optimistic participant tone in the Q&A 
section have significant and negative predictive power for 
stock price crash risk. Importantly, optimistic manager tone 
in the Q&A section has stronger and more negative predic-
tive power than participant tone, both statistically and eco-
nomically. These results indicate that managers, as corporate 
insiders, possess private information and engage in truthful 
communication during conference calls.13
Sub‑sample Analyses
This sub-section presents our sub-sample analyses to further 
investigate how extrinsic motivations, such as external moni-
toring and managerial equity incentives, may affect manag-
ers’ intentions to engage in truthful communication. First, 
we consider external monitoring from the firm’s informa-
tion environment. A better information environment leads to 
more transparent and truthful disclosure because it serves as 
a monitoring mechanism to curb unethical financial report-
ing. An important attribute of the corporate information 
environment is the analyst following, which improves the 
information environment, leading to higher-quality disclo-
sures and lower information asymmetry (e.g., Frankel and 
Li 2004; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Yu 2008). With more 
analysts listening to a conference call, the firm’s information 
flows more efficiently owing to stronger demand-side moni-
toring (Brochet et al. 2019). Thus, we expect that managers 
are motivated to engage in truthful communication when 
subjected to stronger external monitoring, and hence the 
information role of conference call tone will be more pro-
nounced for firms with greater analyst following. The results 
(Table 7 Panel A) are consistent with this expectation.
Next, we consider managerial equity incentives. Previous 
literature suggests that these incentives may induce manag-
ers to engage in short-termist behavior to boost the current 
stock price at the expense of long-term firm value (Beb-
chuk 2009). Equity compensation may motivate managers 
to conceal bad news about firms’ prospects (Benmelech et al. 
2010), and such behavior may lead to higher stock price 
crash risk (Kim et al. 2011a). Thus, we expect that equity 
incentives may compromise managers’ ethical and truthful 
communication intentions, causing the information role of 
conference call tone to be more pronounced when executives 
are less incentivized to hoard bad news. The results (Table 7 
Panel B) provide supportive evidence for our prediction.14
Table 6  Analyses for different call sections and participants
Panel A presents regression results for the predictive power of tone in 
the presentation section (TONE_P) and the Q&A section (TONE_Q) 
on SPCR. Panel B shows results for the effect of manager tone 
(TONE_MAN) and participant tone (TONE_PAR) on stock price crash 
risk. The dependent variables in Models (1), (2) and (3) are COUNT, 
NCSKEW and DUVOL, respectively. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, ** and 
***Represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3)
COUNTt NCSKEWt DUVOLt
Panel A: Different call sections
TONE_Pt−1 − 0.033* − 0.049** − 0.030**
(− 1.86) (− 1.99) (− 1.99)
TONE_Qt−1 − 0.055** − 0.122*** − 0.076***
(− 2.37) (− 3.90) (− 3.84)
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.10 0.10
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8004 8004 8004
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Tone of managers and participants
TONE_MANt−1 − 0.049** − 0.090*** − 0.053***
(− 2.40) (− 3.32) (− 3.06)
TONE_PARt−1 − 0.014 − 0.046** − 0.031**
(− 0.99) (− 2.39) (− 2.57)
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.10 0.10
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8004 8004 8004
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
13 Both Borochin et al. (2018) and Brockman et al. (2015) focus on 
short-term market reactions to tone. Their findings indicate that inves-
tors are suspicious of managers’ disclosure incentives and place more 
value on incentives than private information. However, this does not 
contradict our findings, which suggest that managers possess private 
information on potential stock price crashes and tend to communicate 
truthfully during conference calls.
14 We divide our sample based on CEO option incentives. Our results 
are robust to using CFO option incentives instead.
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Taken together, the sub-sample analyses suggest that 
external monitoring from the corporate information envi-
ronment curbs unethical financial reporting by limiting man-
agers’ ability to hoard bad news and manipulate disclosure 
tone, while managers’ equity incentives have the opposite 
effect.
Research and Practical Implications
This paper makes three important research contributions. 
First, it adds to the previous literature on ethical financial 
reporting, which focuses mainly on written disclosures and 
is limited in its observation of managers’ disclosure behavior 
in direct and spontaneous settings (e.g., Breuer et al. 2018; 
Cho et al. 2010; Craig and Amernic 2018). Bloomfield 
(2008) suggests that conference calls, which contain sponta-
neous conversations that reflect managers’ thought processes 
and behavioral tendencies, may be more suited than written 
disclosures to examining theories based on lexical analy-
sis. Answering Bloomfield’s (2008) call for more research 
using the conference calls setting, our study contributes to 
the literature on ethical financial reporting.15 Moreover, 
research on ethical financial reporting has focused largely 
on the determinants of and incentives for ethical/unethical 
financial reporting (e.g., Patelli and Pedrini 2014, 2015; 
Uddin and Gillett 2002) and firms’ attitudes to decisions 
to engage in such behavior (e.g., Kaplan and Schultz 2007; 
Liu et al. 2015; Merchant and Rockness 1994). Our paper 
extends such research by explicitly exploring the implica-
tions of ethical reporting for investors in the setting of stock 
price crash risk.
Table 7  Sub-sample analyses: 
Information environment and 
managers’ equity incentives
This table presents results for the effect of conference call tone on stock price crash risk in sub-sample tests 
based on the information environment and managers’ equity incentives. Panel A presents results for two 
sub-samples based on analyst following, and Panel B for two sub-samples based on CEO option incentives. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, ** and ***Represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COUNTt COUNTt NCSKEWt NCSKEWt DUVOLt DUVOLt
High Low High Low High Low
Panel A: Analyst following
TONE_Ct−1 − 0.104*** − 0.046 − 0.210*** − 0.081 − 0.126*** − 0.053
(− 2.92) (− 1.15) (− 4.46) (− 1.52) (− 4.20) (− 1.61)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4521 3483 4521 3483 4521 3483
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.11
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO option incentives
TONE_Ct−1 − 0.098* − 0.135*** − 0.179*** − 0.246*** − 0.075* − 0.165***
(− 1.90) (− 2.77) (− 2.59) (− 3.43) (− 1.79) (− 3.91)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2440 2257 2440 2257 2440 2257
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.11
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
15 Our investigation of managers’ ethical reporting behavior is based 
on a large sample of conference call transcripts. The closest previ-
ous study that explicitly investigates ethical reporting in the context 
of conference calls is by Camiciottoli (2011), who analyzes 10 call 
transcripts to examine the strategic usage of ethics-related language 
and finds that managers use conference call disclosures to convey a 
message of trustworthiness and confidence.
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Second, this paper contributes to the literature on corpo-
rate voluntary disclosure, and especially conference call dis-
closure. We add to an important line of research on whether 
and how disclosure tone may be informative or manipulated 
by unethical managers for self-interests (e.g., Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan 2007; Patelli and Pedrini 2014, 2015) by show-
ing that conference call tone provides investors with credible 
signals of extremely bad future outcomes (i.e., stock price 
crash risk). Moreover, whereas previous literature empha-
sizes the association between conference call tone and short-
term market reactions (e.g., Davis et al. 2015), this paper 
provides new evidence for the relatively long-term, forward-
looking information role of call tone for corporate outcomes.
Third, this paper adds to the literature on stock price crash 
risk prediction, which has investigated a range of potential 
determinants such as manager characteristics, corporate 
governance quality, external monitoring and informal insti-
tutional mechanisms (e.g., Andreou et al. 2016, 2017; Chen 
et al. 2019; Kim et al. 2016; Xu et al. 2013). To the best of 
our knowledge, this study is the first to link firm-level stock 
price crash risk with the disclosure attributes of conference 
calls. Given that stock price crashes cause serious damage 
to investors, understanding how soft information in corpo-
rate disclosures predicts such extremely bad events may help 
investors avoid such outcomes.
This paper also extends research on stock price crash risk 
by providing evidence supporting the common assumptions 
made by relevant literature that stock price crash risk reflects 
firm-specific bad news and that managers may possess ex 
ante private information about such risk (Roll 1988). This 
is important and useful for future studies based on similar 
premises.
The results have important practical implications for capi-
tal market participants and practitioners. First, for investors, 
we find that the tone of conference calls helps predict stock 
price crash risk in the next year. As stock price crashes have 
detrimental consequences for investors, our finding is cru-
cial for protecting their interests and benefits, for example 
by enabling them to fire in their stop-loss orders. Investors 
should therefore include call tone as a useful factor in their 
information set when making investment decisions.
Second, we find that extrinsic motivations influence man-
agers’ truthful reporting behavior. Specifically, managers 
tend to report truthfully when the firm has good information 
environment because they are subject to stronger monitor-
ing. This finding speaks to regulators’ efforts to improve 
firms’ disclosure credibility and information environment 
for capital market participants (e.g., Stein 2018; US Cham-
ber of Commerce 2014). Conversely, we find that managers’ 
equity compensation incentives compromise ethical manage-
rial reporting behavior. For firms, while equity-based incen-
tives may be designed to align managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests, our results reveal that high-equity incentives may 
have unintended consequences, such as damaging financial 
reporting ethics.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study inevitably has limitations that might be over-
come in future research. First, the results suggest that 
managers engage in truthful disclosures in the context of 
extreme downside risk. Owing to the scope of the paper, we 
do not explore other contexts potentially relating to man-
agers’ truthful communication. Future studies might shed 
further light on this important issue. Second, we are mind-
ful of debate in the literature over the concept and empiri-
cal measurement of disclosure tone (e.g., Henry and Leone 
2016). Although we do not address this debate directly, we 
mitigate potential concerns by using alternative word clas-
sifications and alternative tone measures (i.e., residual tone 
and tone change) to test the robustness of our results. Third, 
our results indicate the importance of conference call tone 
for stock markets, raising questions about whether it might 
also be predictive for other standard asset pricing anomalies. 
The short sample period in this paper limits our ability to 
test such issues, so future research might investigate these 
research avenues. Fourth, we find that managers engage 
in truthful information disclosures due to strong monitor-
ing induced by a good information environment and lower 
managerial equity incentives. It is also possible that manag-
ers unintentionally reveal truthful information during con-
ference calls, but such cognitive processes are empirically 
unobservable. Future studies might develop novel measure-
ments or explore other possible mechanisms for uninten-
tional truthful communication.
Conclusion
This study investigates whether and how the tone of earn-
ings conference calls predicts stock price crash risk. We 
develop and test two competing hypotheses regarding 
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the information role of call tone in predicting stock price 
crash risk based on theories and studies of ethical finan-
cial reporting and voluntary disclosure incentives. On 
the one hand, managers may use optimistic language as 
an impression management strategy to manipulate inves-
tors’ perceptions of the firm, leading to a positive relation 
between optimistic conference call tone and stock price 
crash risk. On the other hand, managers have motivations 
for ethical disclosure and truthful communication, lead-
ing to a negative relation between optimistic call tone 
and stock price crash risk. We find strong evidence that 
more optimistic tone of conference calls predicts lower 
stock price crash risk, indicating that managers engage in 
truthful communication rather than unethically manipulat-
ing the tone. These results hold up to various robustness 
checks. Moreover, additional analyses suggest that the role 
of optimistic call tone in predicting stock price crash risk 
is more pronounced when the firm has greater analyst fol-
lowing or lower managerial option incentives, suggesting 
that monitoring from corporate information environment 
and managers’ equity incentives are underlying mecha-
nisms for managers’ truthful communication.
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Appendix 1
See Table 8.
Table 8  Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent variables: Stock price crash risk measures
COUNT The difference between the number of firm-
specific weekly returns exceeding 3.20 standard 
deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly 
return over the fiscal year, and the number of 
firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.20 
standard deviations above the mean firm-spe-
cific weekly return.
NCSKEW The negative skewness of firm-specific weekly 
returns during the fiscal year period.
DUVOL The natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns for 
down weeks to that for up weeks. Over a firm’s 
fiscal year period, down (up) weeks are defined 
as all weeks with firm-specific weekly returns 
below (above) the annual mean.
CRASH An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm 
experiences one or more crash weeks in the fis-
cal year, and zero otherwise. Crash weeks are 
defined as those when a firm experiences firm-
specific weekly returns exceeding 3.20 standard 
deviations below the mean for the fiscal year.
JUMP The number of firm-specific weekly returns 
exceeding 3.20 standard deviations above the 
mean firm-specific weekly return for the fiscal 
year.
Test variables: Tone measures
TONE_C Tone over a whole earnings conference call, 
which is the ratio of the difference between the 
numbers of positive and negative words, to the 
total number of words over the whole call.
TONE_P Tone over the presentation section of an earn-
ings conference call, which is the ratio of the 
difference between the numbers of positive and 
negative words, to the total number of words in 
the presentation section.
TONE_Q Tone in the Q&A section of an earnings confer-
ence call, which is the ratio of the difference 
between the numbers of positive words and 
negative words, to the total number of words 
during the Q&A section.
TONE_MAN Manager tone during an earnings conference call, 
which is the ratio of the difference between 
the numbers of positive and negative words, to 
the total number of words spoken by managers 
during a call.
TONE_PAR Participant tone during an earnings confer-
ence call, which is the ratio of the difference 
between the numbers of positive and negative 
words, to the total number of words spoken by 
participants during a call.
RE_TONE_C The residual term of a cross-sectional regression 
of tone on the firm’s current year performance 
and fundamentals.
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Appendix 2
See Table 9.
References
Andreou, P. C., Antoniou, C., Horton, J., & Louca, C. (2016). Corpo-
rate governance and firm-specific stock price crashes. European 
Financial Management, 22(5), 916–956.
Andreou, P. C., Louca, C., & Petrou, A. P. (2017). CEO age and stock 
price crash risk. Review of Finance, 21(3), 1287–1325.
Arslan-Ayaydin, Ö., Boudt, K., & Thewissen, J. (2016). Managers set 
the tone: Equity incentives and the tone of earnings press releases. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 72, S132–S147.
Baginski, S., Demers, E., Wang, C., & Yu, J. (2016). Contemporaneous 
verification of language: Evidence from management earnings 
forecasts. Review of Accounting Studies, 21(1), 165–197.
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2013). The behavior of individual inves-
tors. In G. Constantinides, M. Harris, & R. M. Stulz (Eds.), 
Handbook of the economics of finance (Vol. 2, pp. 1533–1570). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Bebchuk, L. A. (2009). Compensation structures and systemic risk. 
US Government, Washington, DC. Retrieved from https ://www.
govin fo.gov/conte nt/pkg/CHRG-111hh rg523 98/pdf/CHRG-111hh 
rg523 98.pdf.
Benmelech, E., Kandel, E., & Veronesi, P. (2010). Stock-based com-
pensation and CEO (dis)incentives. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 125(4), 1769–1820.
Blau, B. M., DeLisle, J. R., & Price, S. M. (2015). Do sophisticated 
investors interpret earnings conference call tone differently than 
investors at large? Evidence from short sales. Journal of Corpo-
rate Finance, 31, 203–219.
Bloomfield, R. (2008). Discussion of “Annual report readability, cur-
rent earnings, and earnings persistence”. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 45, 248–252.
Borochin, P., Cicon, J., DeLisle, J., & Price, S. M. (2018). The effects 
of conference call content on market perceptions of value uncer-
tainty. Journal of Financial Markets, 40, 75–91.
Bozzolan, S., Cho, C. H., & Michelon, G. (2015). Impression manage-
ment and organizational audiences: The Fiat Group case. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 126(1), 143–165.
Breuer, W., Knetsch, A., & Salzmann, A. J. (2018). What does it mean 
when managers talk about trust? Journal of Business Ethics. https 
://doi.org/10.1007/s1055 1-018-4072-2.
Brochet, F., Miller, G. S., Naranjo, P., & Yu, G. (2019). Managers’ 
cultural background and disclosure attributes. The Accounting 
Review, 94(3), 57–86.
Brockman, P., Li, X., & Price, S. M. (2015). Differences in conference 
call tones: Managers vs. analysts. Financial Analysts Journal, 
71(4), 24–42.
Brown, S., Hillegeist, S. A., & Lo, K. (2004). Conference calls and 
information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
37(3), 343–366.
Burgoon, J., Mayew, W. J., Giboney, J. S., Elkins, A. C., Moffitt, K., 
Dorn, B., et al. (2016). Which spoken language markers iden-
tify deception in high-stakes settings? Evidence from earnings 
conference calls. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 
35(2), 123–157.
Bushee, B. J., Matsumoto, D. A., & Miller, G. S. (2003). Open versus 
closed conference calls: The determinants and effects of broaden-
ing access to disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
34(1–3), 149–180.
Callen, J. L., & Fang, X. (2017). Crash risk and the auditor–client rela-
tionship. Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(3), 1715–1750.
Camiciottoli, B. C. (2011). Ethics and ethos in financial reporting: 
Analyzing persuasive language in earnings calls. Business Com-
munication Quarterly, 74(3), 298–312.
Chen, J., Hong, H., & Stein, J. C. (2001). Forecasting crashes: Trading 
volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock prices. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 61, 345–381.
Chen, J., Tong, J. Y., Wang, W., & Zhang, F. (2019). The economic 
consequences of labor unionization: Evidence from stock price 
crash risk. Journal of Business Ethics, 157(3), 775–796.
Cho, C. H., Phillips, J. R., Hageman, A. M., & Patten, D. M. (2009). 
Media richness, user trust, and perceptions of corporate social 
responsibility: An experimental investigation of visual web site 
disclosures. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
22(6), 933–952.
Table 9  Top 30 Negative and positive words in conference calls
Ranking Negative Positive
Word Percentage Word Percentage
1 Question 18.17 Good 11.95
2 Questions 7.58 Strong 6.56
3 Decline 3.63 Great 5.88
4 Loss 3.14 Better 3.99
5 Negative 1.99 Opportunities 3.66
6 Closing 1.80 Able 3.33
7 Restructuring 1.78 Opportunity 3.27
8 Difficult 1.74 Improvement 2.62
9 Against 1.73 Positive 2.55
10 Late 1.47 Benefit 2.20
11 Declined 1.41 Progress 2.11
12 Challenges 1.21 Best 1.92
13 Challenging 1.08 Improve 1.91
14 Closed 1.06 Pleased 1.91
15 Force 1.04 Improved 1.89
16 Critical 0.90 Success 1.28
17 Recall 0.90 Profitability 1.21
18 Impairment 0.89 Effective 1.19
19 Break 0.85 Excited 1.10
20 Litigation 0.79 Strength 1.07
21 Declines 0.76 Successful 1.06
22 Losses 0.76 Improving 1.04
23 Slow 0.71 Greater 1.01
24 Challenge 0.65 Improvements 1.00
25 Bad 0.65 Confident 1.00
26 Problem 0.61 Achieved 0.93
27 Weak 0.61 Advantage 0.88
28 Volatility 0.61 Gain 0.88
29 Lost 0.60 Despite 0.86
30 Weakness 0.59 Achieve 0.86
The Information Role of Earnings Conference Call Tone: Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk 
1 3
Cho, C. H., Roberts, R. W., & Patten, D. M. (2010). The language of 
US corporate environmental disclosure. Accounting, Organiza-
tions and Society, 35(4), 431–443.
Clatworthy, M., & Jones, M. J. (2003). Financial reporting of good 
news and bad news: Evidence from accounting narratives. 
Accounting and Business Research, 33(3), 171–185.
Craig, R., & Amernic, J. (2018). Are there language markers of hubris 
in CEO letters to shareholders? Journal of Business Ethics, 
149(4), 973–986.
Davis, A. K., Ge, W., Matsumoto, D., & Zhang, J. L. (2015). The effect 
of manager-specific optimism on the tone of earnings conference 
calls. Review of Accounting Studies, 20(2), 639–673.
Davis, A. K., Piger, J. M., & Sedor, L. M. (2012). Beyond the num-
bers: Measuring the information content of earnings press release 
language. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29(3), 845–868.
DeFond, M. L., Hung, M., Li, S., & Li, Y. (2015). Does mandatory 
IFRS adoption affect crash risk? The Accounting Review, 90(1), 
265–299.
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charl-
ton, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological 
Bulletin, 129(1), 74–118.
Evans, J. H., Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., & Moser, D. V. (2001). 
Honesty in managerial reporting. The Accounting Review, 76(4), 
537–559.
Feldman, R., Govindaraj, S., Livnat, J., & Segal, B. (2010). Man-
agement’s tone change, post earnings announcement draft and 
accruals. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(4), 915–953.
Frankel, R., & Li, X. (2004). Characteristics of a firm’s information 
environment and the information asymmetry between insiders 
and outsiders. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37(2), 
229–259.
Frecka, T. J. (2008). Ethical issues in financial reporting: Is inten-
tionally structuring of lease contracts to avoid capitalization 
unethical? Journal of Business Ethics, 80(1), 45–59.
Gibson, R., Tanner, C., & Wagner, A. F. (2013). Preferences for 
truthfulness: Heterogeneity among and within individuals. 
American Economic Review, 103(1), 532–548.
Hannan, R. L., Rankin, F. W., & Towry, K. L. (2006). The effect 
of information systems on honesty in managerial reporting: A 
behavioural perspective. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
23(4), 885–918.
Henry, E., & Leone, A. J. (2016). Measuring qualitative information 
in capital markets research: Comparison of alternative meth-
odologies to measure disclosure tone. The Accounting Review, 
91(1), 153–178.
Hobson, J. L., Mayew, W. J., Peecher, M., & Venkatachalam, M. 
(2017). Improving experienced auditors’ detection of decep-
tion in CEO narratives. Journal of Accounting Research, 55(5), 
1137–1166.
Hobson, J. L., Mayew, W. J., & Venkatachalam, M. (2012). Analyz-
ing speech to detect financial misreporting. Journal of Account-
ing Research, 50(2), 349–392.
Holley, D. M. (1998). Information disclosure in sales. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 17(6), 631–641.
Hooghiemstra, R. (2000). Corporate communication and impression 
management: New perspectives why companies engage in cor-
porate social reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 27(1–2), 
55–68.
Huang, X., Teoh, S. H., & Zhang, Y. (2014). Tone management. The 
Accounting Review, 89(3), 1083–1113.
Hutton, A. P., Marcus, A. J., & Tehranian, H. (2009). Opaque finan-
cial reports,  R2, and crash risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 
94(1), 67–86.
Hutton, A., Miller, G., & Skinner, D. (2003). The role of supplemen-
tary statements with management earnings forecasts. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 41(5), 867–890.
Jin, L., & Myers, S. (2006).  R2 around the world: New theory and new 
tests. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), 257–292.
Jo, H., & Kim, Y. (2008). Ethics and disclosure: A study of the finan-
cial performance of firms in the seasoned equity offerings market. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 80(4), 855–878.
Jones, T. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics 
and economics. Academy of Management Review, 20(2), 404–437.
Jung, M. J., Wong, M. H., & Zhang, X. (2016). Buy-side analysts and 
earnings conference calls. Journal of Accounting Research, 56(3), 
1–40.
Kaplan, S. E., & Schultz, J. J. (2007). Intentions to report questionable 
acts: An examination of the influence of anonymous reporting 
channel, internal audit quality, and setting. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 71(2), 109–124.
Kartik, N. (2009). Strategic communication with lying costs. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1359–1395.
Kim, J. H., Ahmed, K., & Ji, P. I. (2018). Significance testing in 
accounting research: A critical evaluation based on evidence. 
Abacus, 54(4), 524–546.
Kim, Y., Li, H., & Li, S. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and 
stock price crash risk. Journal of Banking & Finance, 43, 1–13.
Kim, J.-B., Li, Y., & Zhang, L. (2011a). CFOs versus CEOs: Equity 
incentives and crashes. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(3), 
713–730.
Kim, J.-B., Li, Y., & Zhang, L. (2011b). Corporate tax avoidance and 
stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 100(3), 639–662.
Kim, J.-B., Wang, Z., & Zhang, L. (2016). CEO overconfidence and 
stock price crash risk. Contemporary Accounting Research, 33(4), 
1720–1749.
Kim, C. F., Wang, K., & Zhang, L. (2019). Readability of 10-K reports 
and stock price crash risk. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
36(2), 1184–1216.
Kim, J.-B., & Zhang, L. (2016). Accounting conservatism and stock 
price crash risk: Firm-level evidence. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 33(1), 412–441.
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of 
analyst ratings of corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 31(2), 246–271.
Larcker, D. F., & Zakolyukina, A. A. (2012). Detecting deceptive dis-
cussions in conference calls. Journal of Accounting Research, 
50(2), 495–540.
Lee, J. (2016). Can investors detect managers’ lack of spontaneity? 
Adherence to predetermined scripts during earnings conference 
calls. The Accounting Review, 91(1), 229–250.
Lee, D. (2017). Corporate social responsibility and management fore-
cast accuracy. Journal of Business Ethics, 140(2), 353–367.
Liu, X. K., Wright, A. M., & Wu, Y. J. (2015). Managers’ unethical 
fraudulent financial reporting: The effect of control strength and 
control framing. Journal of Business Ethics, 129(2), 295–310.
Loughran, T., & McDonald, B. (2011). When is a liability not a liabil-
ity? Textual analysis, dictionaries and 10-Ks. Journal of Finance, 
66(1), 35–65.
Loughran, T., & McDonald, B. (2016). Textual analysis in accounting 
and finance: A survey. Journal of Accounting Research, 54(4), 
1187–1230.
Matsumoto, D., Pronk, M., & Roelofsen, E. (2011). What makes 
conference calls useful? The information content of managers’ 
presentations and analysts’ discussion sessions. The Accounting 
Review, 86(4), 1383–1414.
Merchant, K. A., & Rockness, J. (1994). The ethics of managing earn-
ings: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Pub-
lic Policy, 13(1), 79–94.
Merkl-Davies, D. M., & Brennan, N. M. (2007). Discretionary disclo-
sure strategies in corporate narratives: Incremental information 
 X. Fu et al.
1 3
or impression management? Journal of Accounting Literature, 
27, 116–196.
Newman, M. L., Pennebaker, J. W., Berry, D. S., & Richards, J. M. 
(2003). Lying words: Predicting deception from linguistic styles. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(5), 665–675.
Patelli, L., & Pedrini, M. (2014). Is the optimism in CEO’s letters to 
shareholders sincere? Impression management versus commu-
nicative action during the economic crisis. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 124(1), 19–34.
Patelli, L., & Pedrini, M. (2015). Is tone at the top associated with 
financial reporting aggressiveness? Journal of Business Ethics, 
126(1), 3–19.
Pennebaker, J. W., Mehl, M. R., & Niederhoffer, K. G. (2003). Psy-
chological aspects of natural language use: Our words, our selves. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 547–577.
Price, S. M., Doran, J. S., Peterson, D. R., & Bliss, B. A. (2012). Earn-
ings conference calls and stock returns: The incremental infor-
mativeness of textual tone. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(4), 
992–1011.
Rogers, J., & Stocken, P. (2005). Credibility of management forecasts. 
The Accounting Review, 80(4), 1233–1260.
Roll, R. (1988).  R2. Journal of Finance, 43(3), 541–566.
Ruppel, C. P., & Harrington, S. J. (2000). The relationship of com-
munication, ethical work climate, and trust to commitment and 
innovation. Journal of Business Ethics, 25(4), 313–328.
Stein, K. M. (2018). Improving information for investors in the digital 
age. Address at the Council of Institutional Investors 2018 Fall 
Conference, October 23. Retrieved from https ://www.sec.gov/
news/speec h/speec h-stein -10231 8.
Stocken, P. C. (2000). Credibility of voluntary disclosure. The Rand 
Journal of Economics, 31(2), 359–374.
Uddin, N., & Gillett, P. R. (2002). The effects of moral reasoning and 
self-monitoring on CFO intentions to report fraudulently on finan-
cial statements. Journal of Business Ethics, 40(1), 15–32.
US Chamber of Commerce. (2014). Corporate disclosure effectiveness: 
Ensuring a balanced system that informs and protects investors 
and facilitates capital formation. Center for Capital Markets Com-
petitiveness, Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.cente 
rforc apita lmark ets.com/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2014/07/CCMC_
Discl osure _Refor m_Final _7-28-20141 .pdf.
Vrij, A., Edward, K., Roberts, K. P., & Bull, R. (2000). Detecting deceit 
via analysis of verbal and nonverbal behavior. Journal of Nonver-
bal Behavior, 24(4), 239–263.
Whitener, E. M., Brodt, S. E., Korsgaard, M. A., & Werner, J. M. 
(1998). Managers as initiators of trust: An exchange relationship 
framework for understanding managerial trustworthy behavior. 
Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 513–530.
Xu, N., Jiang, X., Chan, K. C., & Yi, Z. (2013). Analyst coverage, opti-
mism, and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China. Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, 25, 217–239.
Yu, F. (2008). Analyst coverage and earnings management. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 88(2), 245–271.
Yuthas, K., Rogers, R., & Dillard, J. F. (2002). Communicative action 
and corporate annual reports. Journal of Business Ethics, 41(1–2), 
141–157.
Zuckerman, M., & Driver, R. E. (1985). Telling lies: Verbal and non-
verbal correlates of deception. In A. W. Siegman & S. Feldstein 
(Eds.), Multichannel integrations of nonverbal behavior (pp. 
129–147). London: Psychology Press.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
